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1966-2016: LEGAL PHILOSOPHY AS PATIENT
BRIAN FLANAGAN
John Kelly, the 50th anniversary of whose commencement of the new series
of the Irish Jurist is celebrated in these pages, reached a memorable verdict on
contemporary legal philosophy. In a comment alluded to by both Tony Honord
and Ronan Keane in their respective forewords to his posthumously published
monograph, A BrieffHistory of Western Legal Theory, Kelly describes today's
students as being treated to a "course in mental ... athletics, sweating around
the cinder-track of mid-twentieth-century linguistic analysis...".' On the
question of the nature of law, Kelly's verdict is half right. This essay considers
first what it gets wrong, and then what it gets right.
The contributions to legal philosophy of H.L.A. Hart and Ronald Dworkin
were the principal targets of Kelly's disapproval. There is no question that,
following their example, contemporary legal theorists have sought to apply
insights from other philosophical fields. We may justifiably speak of legal
philosophy's interdisciplinary turn. But both Hart and Dworkin's initial
efforts effected indispensable advances. Conversely, whereas subsequent
interdisciplinarity has introduced much technical sophistication, it has yet
to produce a corresponding payoff in understanding. Moreover, it is to legal
philosophy that the insight of the other domain is almost always applied. In
the hands of sparring legal philosophers, interdisciplinarity can take on the
appearance of an arms race; in the hands of philosophers from these other
disciplines, it can take on that of show-stopping, but, ultimately, mark-missing,
intervention. This suggests an organising theme of legal philosophy as patient.
For all the benefits of the interdisciplinary turn, realised and potential, legal
philosophy will remain an immature inquiry until it contributes reciprocally
to cognate fields.
Part I reviews the great advance achieved by Hart and Dworkin through the
application of insights from the philosophy of language. Part II reviews the
subsequent technical expansion of legal philosophy in the service of theories
that both distinguish and fuse law and politics. In a concluding section, I
consider the prospects for the converse scenario, in which legal philosophy
exerts influence on another domain, namely, the philosophy of group agency.
I. THE GREAT ADVANCE
The foundational divide in contemporary legal philosophy concerns whether
the law on a given issue is solely determined by the politics of that particular
issue or is instead determined by a procedure whose content is determined by
broader political forces. The former view may be described as "reductionist"
1. J.M. Kelly, A Brief History of Western Legal Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1992), p.xii.
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legal theory because it posits, in contrast to the traditional, non-reductionist
view, that law is an undifferentiated feature of politics. In the aftermath ofWorld
War II, non-reductionist legal theory confronted three principal questions. One
was the age-old issue of "natural" law, namely, whether a rule's moral qualities
bear on its status as a law. This issue had been given fresh impetus by the
imperative of ensuring maximum resistance to any future fascist regime and
by the criminal convictions of those who had helped carry out Hitler's wicked
domestic policies. But the other two questions were more basic, namely, what
sort of decision does a law consist in; and how might political forces actually
determine a procedure that would determine the law? Any non-reductionist
theory, whether or not it incorporates moral conditions on lawfulness, must
answer both questions. Until H.L.A. Hart published The Concept of Law in
1961, the leading answers were those offered by John Austin's command
theory of law and Hans Kelsen's pure theory of law, respectively.2 Hart realised
that the application of contemporary philosophical methods promised better
ones.
Austin and Kelsen had both emphasised the unification achieved by a
theory that characterises all laws as consisting in a single form of decision,
be it a command to ordinary citizens, or an instruction to officials. Certainly,
the notions of command and instruction both capture the intuition that
laws establish compulsory standards of behaviour. But the theory of law's
intuitiveness was regarded as secondary to its elegance. Hart's first innovation
was to reverse this order of priority:
"Many important distinctions, which are not immediately obvious,
between types of social situation or relationships may best be brought to
light by an examination of the standard uses of the relevant expressions."3
The intellectual support for this innovation Hart had found in the rise of
linguistic analysis which, under the influence of figures such as Ludwig
Wittgenstein and J.L. Austin, had become the philosophical method du jour.4
Henceforth, if a theory of law introduced an absurd consequence, then such
absurdity would be recognised as a strong reason for rejecting that theory.
Linguistic analysis holds that philosophers make progress by elucidating
our shared intuition about the use of language. Applying this method, Hart
consigned to history the existing theories on the sort of decisions in which
laws consist. It had been no secret that Austin's reduction of all laws to
commands that forbade or compelled conduct sat uneasily with the existence
of laws which confer powers, such as the power to marry or to dispose of one's
estate in a will. But Hart took the existence of such tension to be decisive:
"Such power-conferring rules are ... spoken of ... differently from rules which
2. J. Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (London: John Murray, 1832);
H. Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (Berkeley: University of California Press 1960, first
published 1934).
3. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press,1961), p.v.
4. N. Lacey, A Life ofH.L.A. Hart (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).
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impose duties ... What other tests for difference in character could there be?"'
Similarly, there had been no question that Kelsen's reduction of all laws to
conditional instructions (if x happens, then enforce consequence y) ignored
traditional distinctions between the branches of law. But Hart held that the
consequent absurdity of taking a criminal fine to be identical to a tax was fatal:
"The idea that the substantive rules of the criminal law have as their
function (and, in a broad sense, their meaning) the guidance not merely
of officials operating a system of penalties, but of ordinary citizens in the
activities of non-official life, cannot be eliminated."'
Ever since, non-reductionist philosophers have acknowledged that the
decisions in which laws consist will take disparate forms.
Any explanation of conduct that refers to a legal constraint will beg the
question of how the pertinent constraint came to exist. Equally, any prediction
about law-abiding behaviour ultimately refers to the likelihood that the
conditions for the existence of an apt legal system will be satisfied. The concept
of law is of explanatory value only to the extent that it enables such references.
Accordingly, a non-reductionist theory of law ought to be accompanied by an
ancillary explanation of how political forces might actually come to determine
a procedure for determining the law. Hart's second innovation lay in his
development of such an explanation.
Non-reductive theories of law characterise a legal system as depending
on the existence of a procedure that determines compulsory standards of
behaviour. This raises the question of how such a procedure might emerge. The
only suggestion on this crucial matter had been Austin's idea that the law is
determined by the decisions of an entity who is recognised as being "able and
willing to harm" those who would ignore them.' On this approach, political
forces determine the procedure that, in turn, determines the law, through the
enforcement capacity of the decision-maker to which the procedure refers.
Pointing to the case of monarchical succession, Hart vividly exhibited the
inadequacy of this suggestion. Even granting that the deceased King had been
capable himself of enforcing his decrees, there appears to be no reason, absent
fresh violence, that his desired successor should now be recognised as being
similarly capable. Yet, Hart observed, the passage of crown from parent to
child is often an entirely peaceful affair.'
Hart's objection can be framed more vividly still by simplifying the
example. Leave aside the question of succession: how is it that a monarchical
legal system could even exist given the requirement that the monarch must
be "able and willing to harm" those who would ignore his decisions? As a
matter of casual observation, it is clear that no individual can hope to enforce
her decisions over any sizeable group of people on her own. Accordingly,
5. Hart (1961), p.41 (emphasis added).
6. Fn.3, p.39.
7. Austin (1832), p.7 .
8. Hart (1961), pp.52- 55 .
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we remain in the dark as to how a legal system might come to consist in the
decisions of an autocrat or, for that matter, in decisions of a group, such as a
parliament, which comprises but a sliver of the total population.
Hart's alternative story of how political forces might determine a procedure
for determining the law is not itself the product of linguistic analysis. But it may
readily be traced to his confidence in that method's assumptions. Linguistic
analysis supposes the existence of implicit conventions on the uses of terms.
Hart suggested that, alongside linguistic conventions, there may be moral
conventions on the procedures by which the policies applicable to particular
territories ought to be decided, what he called, "public standards of official
behaviour".' We shall label such a convention an "MCP". The procedure that
is the subject of a given MPC might refer to the decisions of an autocrat, a
politburo or a demos alike.
The notion of an MCP distinguishes the functions of policy determination
and policy enforcement. The result is an explanation of how political forces
determine a particular procedure for determining the law that does not rely on
the enforcement capacity of any decision-maker to which the procedure refers.
It allows instead that a suitably motivated group may perform the function
of enforcing, on a wider population, the decisions made by an individual.
Thus, Hart proposed that, if an MCP should characterise a group that is
perceived to be uniquely capable of the enforcement of behavioural norms,
then the procedure in question will determine the law. The procedure forming
the subject of an MCP that characterizes a group such as this Hart termed a
"rule of recognition". The notion of a rule of recognition offered a plausible
explanation of the emergence of a procedure that could determine compulsory
standards of behaviour, and, hence, the contents of a legal system.
Whereas Hart's first innovation prompted legal theory to capture our
intuition about the different forms that laws might take, his second allowed
legal theory to explain how laws might actually come about. While the actual
application of linguistic analysis was confined to the former innovation, that
method offered inspiration for his idea of a convention on the procedure by
which the policies applicable to a particular territory ought to be decided.
Linguistic analysis led similarly to the third and final clear advance of legal
philosophy's interdisciplinary turn, namely, recognition of the need to account
for legal disagreement.
The significance of legal disagreement is illuminated in Ronald Dworkin's
friendly critique of non-reductionist legal theory. The relevant literature is
often described as the Hart-Dworkin debate. But this title obscures two key
features. First, it suggests that the challenge posed by disagreement applies
solely to the invocation of a convention to explain the existence of a procedure
that determines compulsory standards of behaviour. In fact, the challenge
posed by disagreement applies to all theories which state criteria; it applies
equally to the theories of Austin and Kelsen, as well as to natural law theories
which add the criterion that (paradigmatic) legal systems consist in decisions
9. Fn.3,p.116.
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that are just.o Secondly, the title obscures the fact that Dworkin's contribution,
just like Hart's, is attributable to the rise of linguistic analysis. Both rely on the
assumption that philosophers ought to attend to our shared intuition about the
use of language.
In principle, our shared intuition about the use of a term might defy efforts at its
elucidation as a set of necessary and jointly sufficient conditions. Traditionally,
non-reductionist theories of law state that a norm is (paradigmatically) legal
if, and only if, it is determined by a politically privileged procedure or,
alternatively, if, and only if, it is determined by such a procedure and is,
furthermore, just. Dworkin's innovation was to try to show that, as efforts
to elucidate our intuition about the use of the term "law", such theories are
doomed.
Whereas Hart had appealed to our intuition about the use of "law" in cases
where all are agreed on the content of the law, Dworkin invoked cases where
there is disagreement. Crucially, the disagreement persists even though the
application of all posited criteria for the use of the term is agreed:
"[Lawyers] might agree ... about what the statute books and past judicial
decisions have to say ... but disagree about what the law ... actually is
because they disagree about whether statute books and judicial decisions
exhaust the pertinent grounds of law.""
Consider an individual who, though fully competent in distinguishing men
and women, persists in applying "bachelor" to unmarried women. We would
not argue with them over whether a particular spinster/bachelorette was in
fact a bachelor; we would conclude instead that we were simply using the
term differently. In respect of "law", Dworkin suggested that disagreements
might follow an alternative pattern. Suppose that, intuitively, both sides to a
disagreement over the outcome of litigation invoke the pertinent conduct's
lawfulness. If it is also the case that each side agrees on the application of all
possible criteria, then no theory of law that posits criteria will be consistent
with our intuition about the term's use.
Pointing to examples of legal disagreement, 2 Dworkin argued that
the project of stating necessary conditions for the use of "law" ought to be
abandoned because it is unable to achieve the elucidation of our intuition:
"Our sample cases were understood by those who argued them in court
cases and classrooms and law reviews as ... about what criteria they
should use. So ... the project of digging out shared rules from a careful
study of what lawyers say and do [is] doomed to fail." 3
10. John Finnis is the leading contemporary advocate of this view; Finnis, Natural Law and
Natural Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980).
11. R. Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), p.5 . In
Law's Empire, the argument received its current title, "the semantic sting", but was made
initially in Dworkin, "Social Rules and Legal Theory" (1972) 81 Yale L.J. 855.
12. e.g. Dworkin (1986), pp. 15- 30 .
13. Fn.12, p.43.
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Let us label disagreement about the lawfulness of conduct where the application
of all possible criteria for the use of "law" is agreed as "deep" disagreement.
Dworkin's best-known effort to identify an example of deep disagreement
concerns the nineteenth-century New York case of Riggs v Palmer ("Elmer's
case"). In Riggs, a man had made a will in favour of his grandson, Elmer. Elmer
was fearful that his grandfather's new marriage would result in his grandfather
making a new and less favourable will. To pre-empt a change in his inheritance,
Elmer murdered the grandfather. Elmer's crime was discovered, however,
and he was duly convicted of the murder. The legal question concerned the
distribution of the murdered testator's estate. The testator's daughters wanted
the executor to exclude Elmer in light of his wrongdoing. Elmer, in contrast,
insisted that the terms of his grandfather's will be honoured so as to allow
him to inherit his anticipated share. The State of New York's statute of wills
provided that one could create a will subject to various conditions, such as
signature and witnessing. The stated conditions did not include the proviso that
murdering beneficiaries would be excluded. Nevertheless, the courts decided
that the law denied Elmer any inheritance.
For Dworkin's purpose, the important thing about Riggs v Palmer was not
the result in the case but rather the disagreement over what it ought to be.
Proceeding though the curial hierarchy, the case was resolved in alternative
ways. In the highest court, there was a split decision. Thinking about the case
today, students likewise disagree over what the outcome ought to have been.
Crucially, the disagreement appears to be legal in nature; both sides seem to
invoke the lawfulness of the executor's decision to award Elmer his anticipated
share. We appear to agree, that is, that there is an answer to the question of
whether Elmer had legally been entitled to benefit.
Notice that there is complete agreement on the moral question; nobody
disputes that, morally speaking, the murderous Elmer should be denied his
victim's estate. Already, then, the disagreement inRiggs vPalmeris sufficiently
deep to throw up a problem for natural law theory. If, intuitively, an immoral
requirement cannot count as lawful, then our agreement on the immorality of
Elmer's benefiting should lead us to agree that there was no lawful requirement
that Elmer should benefit. Yet, it seems that many do believe that there was
a lawful requirement that Elmer should benefit. Dworkin insisted that the
disagreement in Riggs was also deep enough to undermine theories that hold
that a norm is legal just so long as it has been determined by a politically
privileged procedure.
All agree that Elmer's inheritance is the subject of a norm determined by
the politically privileged procedure, namely, a decision of the legislature of
the State of New York, expressed by the statute of wills. The persistence of
disagreement over the outcome therefore poses the question of what, exactly,
the decision expressed by a statute comprises.14 One possibility is that it
comprises the statute's literal meaning. As it happens, the literal meaning of
14. For posing this question, Riggs v Palmer had been famous in legal philosophy long
before Dworkin offered it as proof of the counter-intuitiveness of criterial theories of
law.
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New York's statute of wills was clear: all agree that, read literally, the statute
implied that Elmer should receive his anticipated share. Accordingly, if the
decision expressed by a statute comprised the statute's literal meaning, then
Elmer is entitled to benefit. Another possibility is that the decision expressed
by a statute derives from the purpose motivating its enactment. By their
enactment of the statute of wills, New York legislators sought to enable
individuals to ensure that, after death, their property would be distributed
according to their expressed wishes. It is clear, however, that this purpose did
not extend to enabling individuals to claim a testator's estate as a reward for
his murder. Accordingly, if the decision expressed by a statute derives from the
purpose motivating its enactment, then Elmer is equally not entitled to benefit.
Both the statute's literal meaning and its purpose are agreed, but there is
nonetheless disagreement over Elmer's legal entitlement. Accordingly, if we
assume that either literalism or purposivism is correct, then to hold that a norm
is legal if it has been determined by a politically privileged procedure conflicts
with our linguistic intuition. Alternatively, we might assume that the notion
of a procedure is sufficiently vague that, on questions to which literalist and
purposivist readings give divergent answers, there is no determined decision
and, hence, no legal norm. In that case, however, the claim that a norm is legal
only if it has been determined by a politically privileged procedure conflicts
with our linguistic intuition. Still, the decision expressed by New York's statute
of wills might consist in neither its literal meaning nor its motivating purpose.
An alternative is that the decision expressed by a statute comprises the statute's
intended meaning.
Consider a doctor who says to his patient, "You're not going to die"."
We may use this example to distinguish three features of a speech scenario.
The first is the speaker's literal meaning: that the patient is immortal. The
second is the speaker's intended meaning: that the patient will not die from
the wound in question. The third is the speaker's purpose in speaking: that
the patient will calm down. In both common law and civilian traditions of
statutory interpretation, lawyers justify their conclusions by reference to the
legislature's intended meaning. 6 According to the intentionalist, the decision
expressed by New York's statute of wills comprises its intended meaning. If,
in contrast to its purpose and literal meaning, the statute's intended meaning
is not a matter of agreement, then intentionalism has the distinction of not
excluding the disagreement over Elmer's entitlement.
We are confident that, in enacting the statute of wills, legislators sought
to enable individuals to ensure that, after death, their property would be
distributed according to their expressed wishes. Equally, we are confident
that, had legislators been presented with the Riggs scenario in the course of
drafting, they would have taken the step of expressly prohibiting individuals
15. The example is due to Kent Bach: Bach, "Conversational Impliciture" (1994) 9 Mind &
Language 124.
16. N. MacCormick and R. Summers, "Interpretation and Justification" in MacCormick
and Summers (eds), Interpreting Statutes: A Comparative Study (Aldershot: Dartmouth
Press, 1991), p.511.
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from claiming a testator's estate as a reward for his murder. These assumptions
point to two alternative policies that legislators might have intended to
express: that of always distributing a deceased's property according to their
expressed wishes; and that of distributing a deceased's property according
to their expressed wishes unless that would benefit their murderer(s). If
legislators failed to foresee the prospect of the murderous beneficiary, then
the statute's intended meaning consists in the former policy. Conversely, if
legislators foresaw that eventuality but then failed to commit their intended
proviso to writing, then the statute's intended meaning consists in the latter.
Thus, interpreters must establish whether the statute's literal meaning fails
to exclude murderous beneficiaries because of a clerical error or because the
intended policy was itself unconsidered in the relevant respect.
In a case such as Riggs v Palmer, we might expect disagreement as to which
of such a pair of mistakes had been committed, and, hence, disagreement as
to the statute's intended meaning. Consequently, if the legislature's decision
comprises the statute's intended meaning, then the application to Elmer's
inheritance of the criterion that a norm is legal if it has been determined by
a politically privileged procedure is up for debate. It follows, in turn, that
the disagreement over Elmer's inheritance does not prove that that criterion
conflicts with our intuition about the use of "law". It seems, thus, that while the
disagreement in Riggs is sufficiently deep to indicate the counter-intuitiveness
of natural law theories, it provides no such indication in respect of criterial
theories that exclude moral conditions. An argument that criterial legal theories
are unable to achieve the elucidation of our linguistic intuition requires an
example of deeper disagreement.
One major effect of Dworkin's critique of criterial legal theory lies in the
reaction of philosophers who are inclined to persist with a criterial approach.
The response with which Hart associated himself, "inclusivism", conceded
that the rule of recognition might be liable to be informed by moral standards."
"Exclusivists", led by Joseph Raz, responded instead by seeking to explain
away the appearance of legal disagreement." The other major effect of
Dworkin's critique was to open an alternative, non-criterial approach to non-
reductionist theory. We consider this approach in Part II.
II. THE GREAT EXPANSION
In his reform of non-reductionist legal theory, one of Hart's explicit goals was
the relegation of a reductionist school of thought, "Legal Realism", which had
risen to prominence in the United States in the first half of the 20th century."
17. e.g. W. Waluchow, Inclusive Legal Positivism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994);
see Hart, "Postscript", in The Concept of Law, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1994).
18. e.g. Raz, "Two Views of the Nature of The Theory of Law: A Partial Comparison", in J.
Coleman (ed.), Hart's Postscript (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 1 .
19. e.g. K. Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush (New York: Oceana, 1930); J. Frank, Law and the
Modern Mind (New York: Brentano, 1930).
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Whereas Realism proposes to reduce law to politics, Hart believed that reflection
on our linguistic intuition discloses an indispensable legal dimension to social
life. Debate between reductionist and non-reductionist theories of law has
endured, with both sides appealing to insights from the philosophy of language
and other fields. In seeking further reform of non-reductionist theory, Ronald
Dworkin drew from political philosophy the notion of reflective equilibrium.
We consider, in turn, the appeal to political philosophy, and, in the service of
reductionist theory, the appeals to continental philosophy of language and to
Wittgenstein's famous rule following considerations. We find that, whilst the
use of these insights has enriched legal philosophy's sophistication, it has not
changed the terms of debate as Hart and Dworkin's earlier work did.
We begin with Dworkin's use of John Rawls' notion of reflective
equilibrium." Reaching reflective equilibrium involves weighing competing
indications as to the nature of some domain to achieve the most reasonable
general principles. Dworkin draws on reflective equilibrium to distinguish
between concepts whose application can be described in terms of necessary
conditions and "interpretive" concepts. Law, he argues, is an interpretive con-
cept: the law on any particular matter is determined by potentially competing
indications, each of which carries a particular weight.21 On this approach,
a politically privileged procedure determines the "pre-interpretive" legal
materials.22 Every legal norm is determined by both the relevant pre-interpretive
norm and the relevant moral consideration. But, crucially, the determined legal
norm may turn out to conflict with either its procedural or moral determinant.
Dworkin delineates an important distinction between substantive morality
and fidelity morality. Substantive morality concerns the justice of the procedural
authority's resolution of the particular question. In contrast, fidelity morality
concerns the justice of assigning resolution of the question to that authority.
Finally, there is the question of whether it is morally justified to adhere to the
pertinent authority's decision in the light of both the decision's substantive (in)
justice and the value of fidelity. Dworkin argues that this question is essential
to the determination of the law in cases of conflict between the pre-interpretive
materials and the relevant moral consideration. Whether a legal norm consists
in the pre-interpretive norm or in some other, more substantively just rule is
determined by the best overall political morality.
In a given case, the morally best reconciliation of the conflicting demands
of substantive and fidelity morality may itself be a matter of disagreement.
Accordingly, by taking law as an interpretive concept, we allow scope
for disagreement over the content of the law even where all agree on both
the content of the pre-interpretive norm and on its injustice. The suggested
approach may thus account for the existence of legal disagreements such as
that in Riggs.
20. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971); see
Dworkin (1986), p.4 24 .
21. Dworkin (1986), p. 90 .
22. Fn.21, p.91.
23. Fn.21, pp.257-258.
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With Riggs, recall, the question is how to explain the disagreement over the
murderer's legal entitlement to inherit his victim's estate. There is agreement
on immorality of allowing Elmer to inherit; let us grant that the legislature
had decided that the sole criterion for inheritance is a testator's expressed
wishes. According to Dworkin, the law is determined by these conflicting
indications according to the respective weights of fidelity and substantive
morality. The correct weighting of these moral priorities in the formation
of the best overall political morality is not self-evident. It is possible, thus,
that lawyers, in assigning different weights to the respective substantive and
fidelity components of the proposed calculation, thereby reach different views
on the law. Accordingly, the disagreement over Elmer's legal entitlement may
be attributable to different views on the applicable overall political morality.2 4
Having discovered a more-or-less acknowledged problem for criterial legal
theory, Dworkin's proposed solution has met with considerable opposition.
It has generated worries in respect of its coherence: the notion of "pre-
interpretive" legal materials,25 and the intelligibility of assigning weights to
competing determinants 26 have both attracted criticism. Equally, its consistency
with ordinary discourse about culpability for problematic legal outcomes has
been challenged.2 ' In contrast, the search for counter-examples to Dworkin's
theory, the method by which Dworkin had himself originally established the
need for an account of disagreement, has not been a focus. But a basic problem
with an appeal to reflective equilibrium in legal theory is that our linguistic
intuition suggests that, in the determination of the law, moral considerations
are, at most, secondary factors.
Imagine an alternative Riggs case. Everything remains identical except for
two features. First, instead of a democratically elected legislative assembly,
the pertinent legislature is a malevolent tyrant. Secondly, the statute of wills
enacted by this tyrant states, explicitly, that, "a murderer shall not, in addition
to his criminal sentence, be disqualified due to his crime from any otherwise
applicable inheritance". All will continue to agree that Elmer is not morally
entitled to inherit. But I suggest that, in this alternative case, there will be no
disagreement as to Elmer's legal entitlement. Rather, we would all agree that
the law says that his grandfather's property is now his. Such agreement seems
to pose a fundamental challenge to the notion of law as an interpretive concept.
Whereas the weight of the factor that supposedly supports denial of Elmer's
legal entitlement remains constant, that of the factor that supports recognition
of his entitlement has diminished. Thus, the weight of substantive morality
remains unchanged, but the weight of fidelity morality is reduced by the fact
that we are now considering fidelity, not to the decision of a democratically
elected assembly, but to an evil dictator. If our legal disagreement in the
24. Fn.21, pp.351-53.
25. e.g. J. Raz, "Dworkin: A New Link in the Chain" (1986) 74 Cal. L. Rev. 1103.
26. e.g. J. Finnis, "On Reason and Authority in Law's Empire" (1987)6 Law andPhilosophy
357.
27. L. Green, "Legal Positivism" in E. Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
Fall 2009 edn, available at: plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-positivism/ [Last accessed
29 August 2016].
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original Riggs case were indeed born of the conflicting weights attributed to
substantive and fidelity morality, then, in the revised scenario, we should, if
anything, be more inclined to deny Elmer's legal entitlement. In fact, to the
contrary, the revisions further incline us to recognise it.
Use of the notion of reflective equilibrium to better align non-reductionist
legal theory with our linguistic intuition seems liable to generate new conflicts
that criterial theories avoid. Interdisciplinary insights have also been called
upon in the service of reductionist legal theory. These, too, have failed to
inspire a convergence.
Hart famously characterised the contrast between theories of law that posit
that all legal questions have determinate answers and Realist theories that
reject the possibility of determinate answers as that between a dream and a
nightmare.28 The argument which Hart offered against the Realist movement
was simply that the way we talk and act supposes that many legal questions
do indeed have answers. Hart's persuasiveness on this point meant that future
debate would concede that our linguistic intuition calls for treating law as an
autonomous concept, according to which a law is determined by a procedure
rather than solely by the politics of the particular issue. This concession has two
implications. First, it implies that any reductionist theory of law must explain
the popular tendency to acknowledge legal categories which do not in fact
exist. The burden of providing this explanation cautions against abandoning
non-reductionist theory unless we are confident in our reasons. Secondly, the
concession implies that all ostensibly law-abiding behaviour can be explained
simply by reference to the politics of the particular issue. Together, these
burdens have tended to marginalise efforts to revive the Realist project.
Non-reductionist theories of law do not exclude politics from the explanation
of law-abiding behaviour. On Hart's approach, for instance, politics are crucial
to the establishment of a rule of recognition; to what legislation gets passed; and
to at least some of the questions that reach appellate courts. Equally, however,
non-reductionist theory denies that the status quo on a particular question is
nothing but the distribution of political relations and interests with respect to
that question alone. Two prominent post-Hartian strands of Realism (latterly,
"Critical Legal Studies") cite developments in both continental and analytic
philosophy of language as pointing to the impossibility of communicating
decisions concerning norms of behaviour and, hence, to the impossibility of
a procedure for determining the law. We first consider a reason to be sceptical
about the case for the impossibility of communicating decisions about norms;
then we consider an example that reveals the difficulty in explaining ostensibly
law-abiding behaviour by reference solely to politics.
Continental philosophy of language overlaps with literary theory and is
associated with figures such as Roland Barthes, Michel Foucault and Jacques
Derrida. In Barthes' words, it pronounces "the death of the author".2 9 The
28. Hart, "American Jurisprudence Through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the Noble
Dream" (1977) 11 Ga. L. Rev. 969.
29. Roland Barthes, "The Death of the Author", in Barthes, Image-Music-Text (London:
Fontana 1977), p. 142 .
133
Brian Flanagan
idea that an utterance communicates a particular meaning is replaced with
the idea that meaning consists in the response of the reader or audience,
"deconstructionism". Applying deconstructionism to law, we arrive at the
claim that law is a sham because decisions about standards of behaviour cannot
be communicated:
"[I]ndeterminacy [is] a general feature of all interpretation; no matter
what constraints are supposedly in place, they will not check the
interpretive will, which can always recharacterize them on the way to
pursuing its own agenda ... [Accordingly] the decisions judges render
do not follow from the materials (laws, precedents, evidence, etc.) they
invoke, materials that could be made to yield almost any decision one
wishes to reach."30
One difficulty with the deconstructionist tradition is that it eschews precision
and step-by-step argument in favour of a discursive, enigmatic style.
Accordingly, it is difficult to discern the premises that are thought to imply
that authors' meanings are in fact inaccessible. As it happens, however, in Saul
Kripke's reading of Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations, analytic
philosophy of language has uncovered such an argument. Kripke does not avow
the argument himself, nor does he attribute it to Wittgenstein; accordingly, its
author is sometimes described as "Kripkenstein". 1 Since this argument, like
deconstructionism, invokes the, "polysemous nature of language",32 we will
take it that it captures the deconstructionist insight.
Kripkenstein argues that all the examples one might have of behaviour that
is consistent with a given linguistic rule are consistent with a countless number
of other rules. Since we are unable to isolate the behaviour that following a
particular linguistic rule consists in, "[t]here can be no such thing as meaning
anything by any word"." The argument is powerful; there have been attempts
to refute it, but no agreement on how to do so. While Kripkenstein may be
taken to provide a clear basis for legal deconstructionism, his argument has
also been invoked directly for the Realist conclusion that the law is radically
indeterminate.34 In response, non-reductionists have claimed variously that
30. S. Fish, "The Play of Surfaces: Theory and Law", in G. Leyh (ed.), Legal Hermeneutics
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), pp.297, 306-307. Similarly, Jack
Balkin, "Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory" (1987) 96 Yale L.J. 743; G. Leyh,
"Toward a Constitutional Hermeneutics" (1988) 32 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 369.
31. S. Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1982).
32. Fish (1992), p.3 07 .
33. Fn.32, p.55.
34. e.g. A. D'Amato, "Pragmatic Indeterminacy" (1990) 85 Nw. U.L. Rev. 148, 173-174;
A.C. Hutchinson, "A Postmodern's Hart: Taking Rules Sceptically" (1995) 58 Modern
L. Rev. 788; R. Charnock, "Lexical Indeterminacy: Contextualism and Rule-following
in Common Law Adjudication" in A. Wagner and others (eds), Interpretation, Law and
the Construction of Meaning (Berlin, New York: Springer, 2006), p. 2 1.
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linguistic rules are not analogous to legal rules," and that legal rule-following
is generated by immersion in a practice rather than by conscious reasoning
about norms." Neither response succeeds, however, in preserving the concept
of law.
The Realist point is not that legal and linguistic rules are analogous, so that, if
one is impossible, so is the other. Rather, it is that the impossibility of linguistic
rules precludes communication. The existence of most legal rules depends on
their communication by an authority. So, following Kripkenstein, such legal
rules are equally impossible. The second response to the Realist's invocation
of Kripkenstein imagines a system of customary norms that evolves without
utterances communicating their content or a rule for their identification. But
if this is the only system of behavioural standards that Kripkenstein permits,
then there are no legal systems that include mechanisms of identification and
of deliberate change, for example, statutory enactment. These are, of course,
the very legal systems that non-reductionist theorists consider paradigmatic.
I suggested earlier that the burden of explaining the popular tendency to
acknowledge non-existent legal categories cautions against abandoning non-
reductionist theory unless we are confident in our reasons. However, there are
good grounds not to invoke Kripkenstein's conclusion as a premise in any
further argument outside the philosophy of language: it is crazy. As Kripke
himself puts it, scepticism about communication is "insane and intolerable"."
Eschewing scepticism about communication does not require a theory as
to why it is false." Answering Kripkenstein is not remotely a "prerequisite for
many things we hold dear, including law"." Apprised of the sceptical argument,
we should simply reject its conclusion pending agreement on a solution. 40 We
do just this in characterising someone as bald despite lacking a solution to the
sorites paradox, 41 and in believing that we are wearing clothes despite being
35. See Brian Bix, "The Application (and Mis-Application) of Wittgenstein's Rule-
Following Considerations to Legal Theory" in D. Patterson (ed.), Wittgenstein and Law
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), p.381 at 396-97.
36. C. Zapf & E. Moglen, "Linguistic Indeterminacy and the Rule of Law" (1996) 84 Geo.
L. J. 485; A. Arulanantham, "Breaking the Rules?" (1998) 107 Yale L. J. 1853; M. Stone,
"Theory, Practice and Ubiquitous Interpretation" in Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Law:
Metaphysics, Meaning and Objectivity, series Social, Political and Legal Philosophy
(New York: Rodopi, 2007), Vol. 2, p. 14 5 .
37. See fn.31 above, p.60.
38. Compare B. Leiter & J. Coleman, "Determinacy, Objectivity, and Authority" (1993) 142
U. Penn. L. Rev. 549, 570-72.
39. See Michael Green, "Dworkin's Fallacy, or What the Philosophy of Language Can't
Teach Us About the Law" (2003) 89 Va. L. Rev. 1897 at 1946-47.
40. In this spirit, David Lewis refers to the claim that "[o]ur language does have a have
fairly determinate interpretation", as "one of those things that we know better than we
know the premises of any philosophical argument to the contrary"; Lewis, Papers in
Metaphysics andEpistemology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp.47,
418.
41. W. Sinnott-Armstrong, "Word Meaning in Legal Interpretation" (2005) 42 San Diego L.
Rev. 465 at 472: "1 ... cannot specify a number of years after which people become old;
yet, some people are old."
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unable to show that we are not simply a brain in a vat.42 The absurdity of
Kripkenstein's conclusion is reflected in the fact that one cannot assert one's
belief in it without self-contradiction. Consider my quotation of Stanley Fish,
above. If the question of the meaning of Fish's words has wrong answers, then
it is difficult to see how the interpretation I offered-that meaning consists in
the response of the reader-is a good argument.43
A second difficulty with reductionism lies in its implication that ostensibly
law-abiding behaviour can be explained simply by reference to the politics of
the particular issue. On this account, behaviour that reflects a consensus that
x is not legally entitled to y is just a function of a political consensus that x
should not have y:
"Where the assertedly determinate legal propositions have some bearing
on the justice of present social arrangements, that sort of determinacy
points to the fact that social movements aimed at rectifying injustice of
the relevant sort have not (yet) been organized.""
Filibusters provide striking counter-examples. Absent a 60th vote to cut off
debate, all may agree that no law has been passed granting Xan entitlement to
Y, even though a 59-member majority believe that X ought to be so entitled.
Of course, there might be a political consensus that Xshould not have Yunless
a norm to that effect can command 60 votes in the senate. But to invoke a
political consensus about the role of the filibuster is to explain our agreement
on X's entitlement not simply by reference to the politics of the particular
issue; rather, it is to explain our agreement by invoking the determination of
the norm that Xshould not have Yby a politically privileged procedure, that is,
by invoking the existence of a corresponding legal norm.
Imagine an alternative history for the recent federal health care legislation
in the US, known as "Obamacare". To break the opposition's filibuster and
thereby pass the Senate, the Bill had to muster 60 votes.45 If it had succeeded
in mustering only 59 votes, then, even though only a minority preferred the
status quo, all would have agreed that citizens would not be legally entitled
to the benefits which the Bill would provide. Had anyone tried to contest his
42. S. Cohen, "Contextualism Defended: Comments on Richard Feldman's 'Skeptical
Problems, Contextualist Solutions"' (2001) 103 Philosophical Studies 87 at 96: "After
all, in the end, [epistemic] skepticism is crazy."
43. See, e.g., Jacques Derrida's accusations of "bad translation" and "linguistic errors"
regarding a translation into English of an interview he had given on the subject of
the philosopher Martin Heidegger's Nazism; Derrida, Letter to the editors of the New
York Review of Books, 14 January 1993, available at: www.nybooks.com/articles/
archives/1 993/feb/11/laffaire-derrida-2/ [Last accessed 29 August 2016].
44. M. Tushnet, "Defending the Indeterminacy Thesis" in B. Bix (ed.), Analyzing Law
(1998), p. 223 at 228. See similarly, S. Fish, "Force" (1988) 45 Wash. & Lee L. Rev.
883 at 892; D. Patterson, "Methodology and Disagreement" in U. Neergaard and others
(eds), European Legal Method: Paradoxes and Revitalisation (Copenhagen: DJOF
Press, 2011), p. 13 0 at 145-46.
45. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (2010) passed 60-39 in the Senate on
foot of a 60-39 cloture vote to end the opposition's filibuster.
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entitlement to these benefits in the courts, their case would have been thrown
out. The idea that the consensus on the litigant's lack of legal entitlement to
the benefits would be the product of a political consensus that he should go
without is inadequate. Whereas the proposition that he had no legal right to
those benefits would both have had considerable bearing on the justice of
social arrangements and have been the subject of a powerful social movement
seeking reform, it would, nevertheless, have appeared perfectly determinate.
CONCLUSION
We noted at the outset that the field of legal philosophy would reach maturity
only when it is in a position to contribute reciprocally to other philosophical
domains. In relation to the theory of precedent, this reciprocal contribution has
long been present. An act's creation of a special reason for performing a similar
act in similar scenarios is an abstract idea that is not confined to any particular
act type. In practice, of course, this idea is applied most prominently in
Western traditions of legal adjudication. Accordingly, discussion of the nature
of a precedent, of what it is exactly, for a later scenario to count as similar, has
long been pursued almost exclusively by reference to the decisions of courts of
law.46 Strictly, then, philosophy is long indebted to lawyers for inquiry into the
nature of precedent, but it remains unclear whether, its outstanding importance
for law apart, such inquiry holds much interest elsewhere.
A more promising avenue for legal philosophy to contribute reciprocally
concerns the phenomenon of no-single-majority court cases. Such a case is
one in which a majority of judges favour a particular decision, each proposed
basis for which a majority of judges reject. Labelled the "doctrinal paradox"
by Lewis Kornhauser and Larry Sager,47 such cases pose a difficulty for
the application of the doctrine of precedent." A broader significance was
subsequently identified by Philip Pettit and Christian List, who saw in such
cases a problem for group action itself.49 The technical results of List and Pettit
and others that comprise the new field ofjudgment aggregation are expansions
on the problem of inconsistent group attitudes presented by the no-single-
majority court case. These have, in turn, lent support to a new argument for
the conclusion that group agents are not reducible to their member agents."
46. See, e.g., G. Lamond, "Precedent and Analogy in Legal Reasoning" in E. Zalta (ed.),
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2006), available at: plato.stanfordedulentriesl
legal-reas-prec/ [Last accessed 29 August 2016].
47. L. Kornhauser and L. Sager, "The One and the Many: Adjudication in Collegial Courts"
(1993) 81 California Law Review 1.
48. See, e.g., Chicago Law Review Editors, "Supreme Court No-Clear-Majority Decisions
a Study in Stare Decisis" (1956) 24 University of Chicago Law Review 99.
49. C. List and P. Pettit, "Aggregating Sets of Judgments: An Impossibility Result" (2002)
18 Economics and Philosophy 89.
50. e.g., C. List and P. Pettit, Group Agency: The Possibility, Design, and Status of Corporate
Agents (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
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That argument is now a feature of theories of political economy," institutional
design" and moral responsibility.5 3 Accordingly, through one of its topics, at
least, legal philosophy is no longer just exploiting advances made elsewhere
but is developing its own contribution.
51. A. Vermeule, The System of the Constitution (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).
52. A. Chilton and D. Tingley, "The Doctrinal Paradox & International Law" (2012) 34
University ofPennsylvania Journal ofInternational Law 67.
53. K. Hess, "The Free Will of Corporations (and other collectives)" (2014) 168 Philosophical
Studies 241.
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